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Abstract
The xed rate tender is one of the main procedures used by central
banks in the implementation of their monetary policies. While academic re-
search has largely dismissed the procedure owing to its tendency to encourage
overbidding, central banks such as the ECB and the Bank of England have
continued using it. We investigate this apparent conict by considering an
auction-theoretic setting with private information about declining marginal
valuations. Since overbidding entails exposure risk, an equilibrium may exist
even if bids are costless and the intended volume is pre-announced. In fact,
the allotment quota may be strictly below one with certainty. Also with
adaptive expectations, overbidding need not escalate. However, the result-
ing allocation is typically ine¢ cient. Empirical proxies of exposure risk are
signicant in both euro and sterling operations. Our ndings have implica-
tions, in particular, for the potential reintroduction of pro rata allotment in
the main renancing operations of the Eurosystem.
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1. Introduction
The xed rate tender is one of the main procedures used by central banks
in the implementation of their monetary policies. In a routine application of
this procedure, a central bank rst announces its intention to provide a given
amount of interbank liquidity against payment of the interest and delivery of
eligible collateral. Market participants then submit bidsthat specify the
amount of liquidity they wish to obtain. Finally, the central bank determines
howmuch liquidity is allotted to each of the bidders. If all bids can be allotted
in full, allotments correspond in size to individual bids. Typically, however,
there is excess demand and bids must be allotted on a pro rata basis.
It is probably fair to say that academic research has largely dismissed the
xed rate tender because of its tendency to encourage strategic overbidding.
Indeed, the procedure cannot work in a complete-information setting when
there is excess demand. For example, consider n = 10 bidders with a demand
of i = 0:2 each when the amount of interbank liquidity to be provided is
1. If all bids are for the amounts that are genuinely required, each bidder
obtains only qi = 0:1 after pro rata allotment. Therefore, bidders have an
incentive to overbid. But bidders that expect competing bidders to overbid
have an incentive to inate their own bids even more. Thus, expectations of
overbidding are spiraling, and there is no equilibrium. Moreover, in reality,
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the xed rate tender has not always performed to the satisfaction of all market
participants. In particular, during a well-documented episode at the start of
Stage III of Economic and Monetary Union in Europe, levels of aggregate
bids escalated out of all proportion to the amounts of liquidity to be provided.
As a consequence, the procedure was abandoned in June 2000.1
Notwithstanding this experience, central banks such as the European
Central Bank (ECB) and the Bank of England (BoE) have continued using
the xed rate tender. In the euro area, the xed rate tender with pro rata
allotment has been employed to absorb liquidity in ne-tuning operations, to
distribute funds provided through the US dollar term auction facility, and to
allot EUR/CHF foreign exchange swaps. In the United Kingdom, the proce-
dure has been used in the weekly open market operations and in ne-tuning
operations. Interestingly, the mechanism has tended to work quite smoothly
in all these cases. Indeed, as Table 1 shows, the overbidding episode in the -Table 1
about
here-euro area, with a mean log bid-to-cover ratio of 2.92, is a rather exceptional
case.2
To investigate the apparent conict between theory and practice, and to
better understand the determinants of the smooth operation of the procedure,
we study the possibility of an equilibrium in a somewhat richer theoretical
1See, e.g., Ayuso and Repullo (2001), Breitung and Nautz (2001), Ehrhart (2001), and
Nautz and Oechssler (2003, 2006).
2The bid-to-cover ratio is the ratio of total bids to the intendedvolume of the oper-
ation. All logs are with respect to the natural base.
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framework. Specically, we assume that bidders have private information,
possibly correlated, about their own marginal valuations functions. In this
setting, overbidding entails exposure risk, i.e., the risk of receiving an overly
large allotment. We show that the presence of exposure risk has important
consequences for bidding behavior.3
For example, in a liquidity-providing operation, a bidder that excessively
inates its bid may receive a very large allotment if aggregate competing bids
are signicantly below the level it expected. That bidder not only receives
excess liquidity but is also obliged to deliver the corresponding amount of
collateral. However, holding excess liquidity is costly, e.g., in terms of interest
rate spreads. Moreover, the obligation to deliver collateral may entail high
fees for securities lending if there is a shortage of eligible collateral after the
tender.4
Because overbidding entails exposure risk, we can show that an equilib-
rium is sustainable even if bids are costless and the intended volume of the
operation is pre-announced. Intuitively, if there is a possibility of exposure
risk, incentives to overbid remain limited provided that competitors are like-
wise expected not to overbid to an excessive extent. Using this observation,
3A related exposure problem arises in the theory of multi-unit auctions. There, a
bidder with increasing marginal valuations may end up making losses when competition
is unexpectedly strong. See, e.g., Krishna and Rosenthal (1996).
4Nyborg and Strebulaev (2001) stress the possibility that bidders fear the scarcity of
liquidity in the after-market. In the present example, exposure risk is essentially the mirror
image of that e¤ect, capturing a scarcity of collateral in the after-market.
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the existence of an equilibrium follows from a standard existence theorem for
Bayesian games. We also discuss extensions and welfare implications. Specif-
ically, we consider an example of an equilibrium in which rationing occurs
with certainty. Then, in a dynamic extension with adaptive expectations
and myopic optimization, moderate overbidding factors are shown to return
quickly to the equilibrium level. Finally, we prove that the xed rate tender
typically yields ine¢ cient allocations even if there is no failure to coordinate.
To test the empirical importance of exposure risk for bidding behavior
in xed rate tenders, we ran regressions of bid amounts in the weekly euro
operations conducted between January 1999 and June 2000, and in the weekly
sterling operations conducted between May 2006 and October 2008. Proxies
of exposure risk prove to be signicant for both cases, conrming our main
hypothesis. However, exposure risks are less pronounced in the euro area
than in the UK. Our interpretation of these ndings is that, apparently,
there was a mismatch between the collateral framework of the Eurosystem
and its tender procedures during the considered period, while there was no
such mismatch in the case of the BoE. We use our ndings to comment on
the potential reintroduction of xed rate tenders with pro rata allotment in
the main renancing operations of the Eurosystem.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we survey
some recent uses of the xed rate tender. Section 3 introduces the theoretical
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framework. The existence theorem is stated and proved in Section 4. Sec-
tion 5 contains an example which illustrates the possibility of rationing with
probability one. A dynamic extension is considered in Section 6. Section 7
deals with the e¢ ciency of the equilibrium allocation. The empirical test is
conducted in Section 8. Section 9 reviews some related literature. Section
10 concludes. The Appendix contains technical proofs.
2. Recent uses of the xed rate tender
This section surveys recent uses of the xed rate tender in the euro area
and in the UK. We focus on the xed rate tender with pro rata allotment, in
which potential bidders are informed in advance about the intended (max-
imum) volume of the operation or have at least a good idea of what it will
be. Operations in which participants are notied in advance that all bids
will be allotted in full as used, e.g., by the Eurosystem from October 2008 in
its main and longer-term renancing operations are not consistent with this
denition, neither are operations in which the central bank provides little
information prior to the operation regarding how it intends to allot liquidity,
as conducted, for example, by the Swiss National Bank.5
Altogether, we nd nine recent cases of the use of the xed rate ten-
der with pro rata allotment (cf. Table 1). These cases originate from the
5See, e.g., Jordan and Kugler (2004).
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following six data series:
(1) Euro ne-tuning operations. Between May 2003 and October 2008, the
ECB conducted 32 of its ne-tuning operations as xed rate tenders with
pro rata allotment. These operations were liquidity-absorbing. Figure 1 -Figure
1
about
here-
shows the development of the allotment quota.6 An occurrence of excessive
overbidding appears in the gure as a very short bar. As can be seen, the
performance of the pro rata allotment scheme was overall quite satisfactory
in these operations.
(2) Term auction facility. Between December 2007 and October 2008, the
Eurosystem allotted US dollar liquidity to its counterparties through 21 xed
rate tenders. Collateral had to be ECB eligible. The US dollars were pro-
vided by the Federal Reserve by means of a temporary swap line established
in connection with the Term Auction Facility. Two features are remarkable.
First, the interest rate was determined as the marginal rate of the simultane-
ous Federal Reserve auction. Second, there was a maximum bid limit, equal
to 10 percent of the pre-announced amount of liquidity to be provided. Ta-
ble 2 lists some key data for these operations. We note a clearly discernible -Table 2
about
here-downward trend in the allotment quota.
(3) Foreign exchange swaps. Between October 2008 and January 2010, the
6The allotment quota is the ratio of the total allotment to total bids.
7
ECB conducted 70 liquidity-absorbing EUR/CHF foreign exchange swap op-
erations in co-operation with the Swiss National Bank. The announcements
included the price (i.e., swap points) as well as the intended volume of the
respective operation. Figure 2 compares intended volumes for the one-week -Figure
2
about
here-
swaps with total bids. The intended volumes were e20 billion before Feb-
ruary 2009, and e25 billion thereafter. The bid-to-cover ratio initially rose,
with a tendency to destabilize, but recovered later without changes to the
intended volumes.
(4) The overbidding episode. From January 1999 to June 2000, the Eu-
rosystem conducted 76 main renancing operations as xed rate tenders.
These weekly tenders o¤ered credit for two weeks. There was no explicit
announcement prior to the tenders regarding the total amount of liquidity
to be provided. Instead, the decision about the total allotment was based,
without binding commitment, upon a benchmark allotment, which is the
amount of interbank liquidity that allows counterparties, on aggregate, to
smoothly fulll their reserve requirements.7 In fact, on average during the
episode, the ECB tended to allot amounts somewhat above the benchmark
allotment. Counterparties were able to estimate the benchmark allotment
reasonably well from information on the liquidity situation of the overnight
7The formula for the calculation of the benchmark allotment can be found, e.g., in the
Annex of European Central Bank (2002). For a theoretical rationale of the benchmark
allotment, see Ewerhart et al. (2009).
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market. The performance of the main renancing operations with pro rata
allotment was unsatisfactory owing to a rising bid-to-cover ratio.8
(5) Sterling ne-tuning operations. During the period June 2006 to March
2009, the BoE conducted 45 ne-tuning operations as xed rate tenders.
Somewhat less than half of those operations were liquidity-providing, a small
majority were liquidity-absorbing. These operations performed well.
(6) Sterling weekly open market operations. Between May 2006 and February
2009, the BoE conducted altogether 149 regular open market operations as
xed rate tenders, all of which had a maturity of one week. The size of the
operations was part of the scheduled announcements. The operations were
liquidity-providing until early October 2008, after which they were liquidity-
absorbing and conducted via the sale of Bank of England sterling bills. A
maximum bid of 40 percent of the total amount on o¤er applied. In all
the operations, there was signicant overbidding, yet the bid-to-cover ratio
always remained within reasonable bounds.
The examples show that an escalation of bids in a series of xed rate tenders
with pro rata allotment is by no means inevitable. In fact, excessive overbid-
ding occurred in only one of the nine series. Before continuing the discussion
8The liquidity policy of the ECB did not stop the overbidding. Bindseil (2005) argues
that the central bank cannot maintain excess liquidity until the end of the reserve main-
tenance period. An alternative explanation, suggested by our ndings, is the absence of
exposure risk.
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of the evidence, we examine a theoretical model of the xed rate tender.
3. The model
The central bank intends to distribute one unit of a perfectly divisible
good at price p0  0. There are n  2 bidders. Each bidder i = 1; :::; n is
asked to submit a bid bi  0. The allotment to bidder i is then
bqi(bi; b i) =
8<: bi if bi + b i  1bi
bi + b i
if bi + b i > 1,
(1)
where b i =
P
j 6=i bj denotes the aggregate competing bids of bidders j 6= i.
Bidder is marginal valuation vi(qi; i) at quantity qi  0 depends on a
type parameter i, drawn from an interval [i; i], where 0  i < i. Only
bidder i observes i. The joint distribution of types is given by a density
f(1; :::; n). Thus, types may be correlated. We assume that vi(qi; i) is
continuously di¤erentiable in (qi; i) with @vi=@qi < 0, as illustrated in Figure
3.9 Type is demand at p0 is dened as the maximum quantity qi such that
vi(qi; i)  p0. In fact, to simplify the exposition, we assume that type i has
a demand of just i.10 We also assume that an individual bidders demand -Figure
3
about
here-
is bounded away from total supply, i.e., i < 1 for all i.
9Marginal valuations may be declining, e.g., owing to collateral requirements. See Ew-
erhart et al. (2010).
10In fact, two bidders with the same demand at p0 might possess di¤erent marginal
valuation functions. Our results do not depend on this assumption.
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Payo¤s for bidder i are given by
i(bi; b i; i) =
Z bqi(bi;b i)
0
vi(qi; i)dqi   p0bqi(bi; b i). (2)
In Figure 3, i(bi; b i; i) corresponds to the signed area bordered by the
vertical axis, the horizontal line at p0, the marginal valuation curve, and a
vertical line at the allotment to bidder i.
A (pure) strategy for bidder i is a mapping i : [i; i]! R+ that assigns a
bid bi = i(i)  0 to each type i. For a given prole fj(:)gj 6=i of strategies
for bidders j 6= i, expected payo¤s for a bidder i of type i resulting from a
bid bi are given by
i(bi; i) =
Z 1
0
i(bi; b i; i)dGi(b i), (3)
where Gi(:) denotes the distribution function of b i =
P
j 6=i j(j), condi-
tional on i.
The xed rate tender is modeled here as a game of incomplete informa-
tion (cf. Harsanyi, 1967-68). In line with the auction-theoretic literature
pioneered by Vickrey (1961), we search for a Bayesian Nash equilibrium for
this game. In equilibrium, each bidder is deemed to correctly anticipate
the strategies (i.e., the bid functions) chosen by the other bidders. Via the
strategies, the uncertainty about types translates into uncertainty about the
size of aggregate competing bids. Thereby, any bid determines a probability
distribution for the allotment to the individual bidder. Each bidder then
11
chooses its bid so as to maximize the expected payo¤s from this uncertain
outcome.
We now discuss the optimal bid in the xed rate tender. Bidding below
demand is obviously strictly dominated. Indeed, the only case where demand
reduction is (weakly) optimal is when an individual bidders demand exceeds
total supply and aggregate competing bids are nil. This, however, is not
possible under our assumptions. Further, note that a bidder with vanishing
demand optimally bids zero because a strictly positive bid always leads to
a strictly positive allotment, which would be suboptimal. The trade-o¤ for
a bidder i with type i > 0 is as follows. When bidding bi  i, there are
three cases, depending on aggregate competing bids. First, if b i  1   bi,
then there is no rationing, and the allotment to bidder i weakly exceeds its
demand. Of course, this case is not possible if bi exceeds unity. Second, if
1  bi < b i  b0 i  bi 1 ii , then there will be rationing, yet the allotment to
bidder i nevertheless weakly exceeds its demand. Finally, if b i > b0 i, then
the allotment to bidder i after rationing falls short of its demand.
The rst-order condition reects these cases and balances the likelihood
of gains from receiving marginal units within demand against the likelihood
of losses from receiving marginal units exceeding demand. For example, for
a well-behaved distribution of b i that allows a density gi(:), the necessary
12
rst-order condition for an interior maximum is11
fp0   vi(bi; i)gGi(1  bi)
+
Z b0 i
f1 big+
fp0   vi( bi
bi + b i
; i)g b i
(bi + b i)2
gi(b i)db i
=
Z 1
b0 i
fvi( bi
bi + b i
; i)  p0g b i
(bi + b i)2
gi(b i)db i. (4)
Figure 4 illustrates the expressions appearing in the rst-order condition (4), -Figure
4
about
here-
such as the marginal valuation and the derivative of the allotment rule, both
of which are considered here as functions of b i.12
4. Equilibrium bidding
This section deals with the existence of an equilibrium in the xed rate
tender with a pre-announced intended volume. Intuitively, the crucial con-
dition for an equilibrium to exist is to exclude the possibility of mutually
reinforcing expectations of overbidding. To achieve this, bidders should nd
it in their interests to overbid only moderately when their competitors do the
same. Thus, in equilibrium, the likelihood and potential detriment of a low
demand realization should be important in view of the extent and potential
detriment of expected excess demand.
Formally, choose parameters m and M , once and for all, such that m >
0 and maxf1; :::; ng < M < 1. Consider a bidder i of type i. Let
11As usual, fxg+ = x if x  0, and fxg+ = 0 if x < 0.
12Of course, the derivative of the allotment rule is well-dened for b i 6= 1  bi only.
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(i; i) =prfi +
P
j 6=ij  M and
P
j 6=ij  mjig denote that bidders
assessment of the probability that total demand is bounded by M , while
aggregate competing demand weakly exceeds m.13 Further, let "(i; i) =
E[fi +
P
j 6=ij   1g+ji] denote the excess demand expected by that bid-
der. Write " and , respectively, for the supremum of "(i; i) and the in-
mum of (i; i), taken across all bidders and type realizations. Finally, let
s = minfj@vi
@qi
j : i = 1; :::; n; qi  ig and S = maxfj@vi@qi j : i = 1; :::; n; i 
qi  iM g, respectively, denote the minimum slope, in absolute terms, of
the marginal valuation curve for allotments below i, and the corresponding
maximum slope for allotments between i and iM , as illustrated in Figure 3.
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The following lemma is the key result driving the existence theorem.
Lemma 1. Let  satisfy 1
M
    <   m1 MM3 s"S . Assume that each
bidder j 6= i follows some strategy j(:) such that j  j(j)  j for all
j. Then bidder is best response i(:) exists and satises i  i(i)  i.
The proof is in the Appendix. The lemma nds conditions under which
expectations of moderate overbidding induce likewise moderate overbidding.
Moderate means here using a factor of no more than , where  is taken
13To understand the intuitive role of the second constraint in the denition of (i; i),
note that bqi may be quite inelastic in bi when b i is small. E.g., for bi = 2 and b i = 0:1,
a decrease of bi by 0:1 lowers bqi by merely 0:02. Therefore, the risk of low demand with
b i too small may indeed matter little as a limiting factor to overbidding.
14Note that the parameters s and S are well-dened and strictly positive. Indeed,
@vi=@qi is continuous on compact areas dened by either qi  i or i  qi  i=M .
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from the interval [;). Note that the upper bound  increases in 
and s, and decreases in " and S. Thus, consistent with intuition, the range
of non-escalating overbidding factors widens as exposure risk becomes more
important in view of expected excess demand.
If  < , then Lemma 1 implies existence of a mixed Nash equilibrium
in the xed rate tender. A mixed strategy for bidder i is here a probability
distribution i on R+  [i; i] such that the marginal distribution of i on
[i; i] coincides with bidder is type distribution. We arrive at the main the-
oretical result of this paper, a proof of which may be found in the Appendix.
Theorem 1. Assume "S < m1 M
M2
s. Then the xed rate tender with pro
rata allotment allows a mixed Nash equilibrium. In this equilibrium, bidders
overbid by a factor of at most 1=M , and the allotment quota never drops
below M=(
Pn
i=1 i).
Thus, provided that expected excess demand is low in view of exposure risk,
the xed rate tender with pro rata allotment allows an equilibrium even if
bids are costless and the intended volume is pre-announced.15
5. Rationing with probability one
The following example illustrates the possibility of a Bayesian equilib-
15As an illustration, let types be uniformly distributed, with all i exceeding 1=n by a
small amount only. Then an equilibrium exists.
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rium. It also shows that the allotment quota may stay strictly below one
with certainty.
Example 1. There are two bidders, with independent types. Bidder is type
i is drawn from the interval [ 1+1 ;

+1
] according to the density
fi(i) =
2(+ 1)
  1 (1  i), (5)
where  > 1. This bidders marginal valuation for an allotment qi is given
by
vi(qi;i) = p0 +
i   qi
q2i (1  qi)
. (6)
There is a pure Nash equilibrium in which type i bids i(i) = i=(1  i).
Moreover, for any combination of bidder types, the allotment quota is strictly
smaller than one.16 
In the example above, rationing occurs with probability one. Nevertheless,
an equilibrium exists because marginal valuations fall quickly, and the prob-
ability of high types, that overbid to a greater degree, is comparatively low.
Notably, an equilibrium in which rationing occurs with certainty di¤ers
structurally from an equilibrium in which with positive probability all bids
are fullled. In the former, there is a coordination problem with respect to the
16To verify these claims, assume that j(j) = j=(1 j) for all j , where j 6= i. Then,
bidder js bids are distributed on the interval [1;2], so that any positive bid by bidder
i engenders pro rata allotment. Hence, when bidding bi against type j , bidder i obtains
the allotment bqi = bi=(bi + j(j)). Bidder is problem is strictly concave, and leads to
the necessary and su¢ cient rst-order condition
R
i bqibqi fj(j)dj = 0. Replacing bqi by the
explicit expression shows then that i(i) is indeed optimal.
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extent of overbidding. That is, the equilibrium strategies of all bidders may
be scaled up by an arbitrary factor without a¤ecting the resulting allotments.
In an equilibrium in which with positive probability all bids are fullled,
however, re-scaling of all bids does not in general lead to a new equilibrium.
This is because the allotment changes in the case of bids where the bidder is
uncertain as to whether they lead to rationing or not.
The potential indeterminacy of the equilibrium has implications in a re-
peated setting where expectations about bidding may depend on the outcome
of earlier operations. The prevalent view in the literature is that the develop-
ment of myopic and adaptive expectations is a consequence of the perceived
non-existence of the equilibrium. A weakness of that interpretation, how-
ever, is that participants in a bidding race would be required to adhere to
the hypothesis of, say, an unchanged allotment quota despite the recurrent
empirical rejection of that hypothesis. In an alternative interpretation, sug-
gested by Example 1, expectations in an overbidding episode are in fact
rational, only the coordination along the linear trend is adaptive.
6. Dynamics
This section studies a dynamic extension of the model introduced in Sec-
tion 3. Time  = 0; 0 + 1; ::: is discrete and tenders are organized sequen-
tially. At the beginning of each period  , a new type vector (1(); :::; n())
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is drawn according to the density f(1; :::n). Thus, types are independent
across periods, but possibly correlated within periods. In contrast to our
assumptions made so far, biddersexpectations are not necessarily aligned.
Instead, we assume adaptive expectations, meaning that bidders expect in
period  + 1 that competitors will overbid to the same degree as in period
 . Moreover, bidders myopically choose their bids bi() so as to maximize
expected payo¤s in period  .
Theorem 2. Under the assumption of Theorem 1, assume that all bidders
have exaggerated their demands in period   0 by a factor of no more
than (), where () 2 [;). Then, with adaptive expectations and
myopic optimization, bidders exaggerate their demands in period  + 1 by a
factor of no more than ( + 1), where ( + 1) < (). In fact, starting
from any initial value (0) 2 [;), the sequence f()g=0;::: declines
exponentially until it falls and stays below .
Proof. By assumption, bidder i expects that aggregate competing bids
b i(+1) =
P
j 6=i bj(+1) satisfy b i(+1)  ()
P
j 6=i j(+1) for all type
proles (1( +1); :::; i 1( +1); i+1( +1); :::; n( +1)). We claim that the
optimal bid for bidder i in period  + 1 satises bi( + 1)  ( + 1)i( + 1),
where ( + 1) = (1   )() for some  > 0. Clearly, bi( + 1) = 0 if
i( + 1) = 0. Consider therefore the case i( + 1) > 0. To establish a
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contradiction, assume that bi( + 1) > ( + 1)i( + 1). We compare the
LHS and RHS of bidder is rst-order condition, as in the proof of Lemma
1. For this, note that
b i( + 1)  b0 i( + 1)  b i( + 1) 
1  i( + 1)
i( + 1)
bi( + 1) (7)
< ()
X
j 6=i
j( + 1)  f1  i( + 1)g( + 1) (8)
 ()fi( + 1) +
X
j 6=i
j( + 1)  1 + g. (9)
Hence, in analogy to inequality (23),Z 1
b0 i
(b i( + 1)  b0 i( + 1))dGi(b i)  ()("+ ). (10)
For a su¢ ciently small  such that 1
M
 () < m1 M
M3
s
("+)S
, we obtain the
desired contradiction. Finally, note that  can be chosen independently of 
because () is decreasing in the relevant domain. 
Thus, myopic best responses to adaptive expectations may lead to a steady
decline in overbidding factors to the level predicted for equilibrium strate-
gies. The range of overbidding factors over which this type of convergence
is obtainable clearly depends on the relative importance of expected excess
demand and exposure risk, as discussed before. Nevertheless, Theorem 2
can be seen as an optimisticcounterpart to Nautz and Oechsslers (2003)
divergence prediction.17
17On the other hand, Theorem 2 makes no prediction for the case that overbidding
factors already exceed . This leaves room for the interesting possibility that a bid race
might continue solely as a result of misaligned expectations (cf. Ehrhart, 2001).
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7. Welfare
The xed rate tender commonly results in an ine¢ cient allocation when-
ever bidders nd it di¢ cult to coordinate their expectations. As we show
in this section, however, the situation is not much better when bidders have
equilibrium expectations. Intuitively, when there is a possibility of excess de-
mand, the allotment for some bidder must fall short of demand with strictly
positive probability. Since that bidder makes an optimal choice in equi-
librium, the allotment must likewise exceed demand with strictly positive
probability. In an e¢ cient allocation, however, the allotment never exceeds
a bidders demand.
Formally, let
W (q; ) =
nX
i=1
f
Z qi
0
vi(eqi; i)deqi   p0qig (11)
denote the welfare associated with an ex-post allocation q = (q1; :::; qn) and
a type vector  = (1; :::; n). Note that no welfare is associated with any
fraction of the good potentially left with the central bank. An ex-post allo-
cation q is feasible if qi  0 for all bidders i and
Pn
i=1 qi  1. Given , an
ex-post allocation q is e¢ cient if it maximizes W (:; ) under the feasibility
constraint.
Theorem 3. Assume that
Pn
i=1 i > 1 with strictly positive probability.
Then, in any equilibrium of the xed rate tender, pure or mixed, the ex-post
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allocation will be ine¢ cient with strictly positive probability.
Proof. Consider rst a pure Nash equilibrium fi (:)gi=1;:::;n. Denote by
q() = (q1(); :::; q

n()) the ex-post allocation resulting from that equilib-
rium as a function of  = (1; :::; n). To provoke a contradiction, assume
that q() is e¢ cient with probability one. Since individual allotments ex-
ceeding demand are ine¢ cient, vi(qi (); i)  p0 with probability one, for all
i. Furthermore, since there is a possibility of excess demand, there must be
some bidder i such that vi(qi (); i) > p0 with strictly positive probability.
However, from the optimality of i (i),Z
fvi(bqi(i (i); b i); i)  p0g@+bqi@bi (i (i); b i)dGi(b i)  0, (12)
where @+bqi
@bi
> 0 denotes the right derivative of bqi(bi; b i) with respect to bi.
Integrating (12) over i yields
Z
fvi(qi (); i)  p0g
@+bqi
@bi
f()d1:::dn  0, (13)
which is the desired contradiction. Thus, any pure Nash equilibrium is inef-
cient. In a mixed equilibrium  = (1; :::; 

n), the ex-post allocation q
(b)
depends directly on b = (b1; :::; bn). As above, there is then a bidder i such
that vi(qi (b); i)  p0 with probability one and vi(qi (b); i) > p0 with strictly
positive probability. Denote by ()i the mixed strategy that increases all
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bids in i uniformly by a factor  > 1. Optimality of 

i implies
@+
@

=1
Z
id(
()
i ; 

 i) =
Z
fvi(qi (b); i)  p0g
@+bqi
@bi
bid
(b; )  0. (14)
Since in equilibrium, bi > 0 with probability one, the assertion follows as
above. 
Thus, when there is a positive probability that aggregate demand exceeds
supply, then the allocation implemented through the xed rate tender will
be ine¢ cient even with equilibrium expectations.
8. Empirical test
To assess the practical importance of exposure risk for bidding behavior
in xed rate tenders, we use data on liquidity-providing operations conducted
by the Eurosystem in the period January 1999 to June 2000, and by the BoE
in the period May 2006 to October 2008.
The test is based on the following reduced-form model of bidding behav-
ior. The endogenous variable is the log of total bids bt submitted in tender
t, where t = 1; 2; 3,... counts the weekly tenders in chronological order.
ln bt = 0 + 1t+ 2 ln at + 3 lnbat 1 + 4 ln bt 1 + 5 ln bt 2
+ 6(  r)t + 7(  )t + t (15)
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In this specication, at and bat 1 are the intended volume and the previous
allotment, respectively.18 To take account of the two-week maturity in the
euro area, we include two lagged variables of bids, bt 1 and bt 2. The interest
rate applied by the central bank in the tender is denoted by r. Arbitrage
possibilities are proxied by the spread between the unsecured rate and the
tender rate, (   r)t, where the unsecured rate  corresponds to the two-
week EONIA swap rate for the euro area and to the one-week LIBOR for the
UK, respectively.19 The hypothesis of exposure risk is operationalized by the
spread between unsecured and secured rates, ( )t, where the secured rate
 is the ECBs market repo rate for the euro area and the one-week general
collateral rate for the UK, respectively.20
The time series for the BoE was split into operations that settled on or
before August 2, 2007, and operations that settled on or after August 9,
2007. We refer to the former as the pre-crisis sample, and to the latter as
the crisis sample. The model has been estimated by ordinary least squares
for the three samples, i.e., ECB, BoE pre-crisis, and BoE crisis. Table 3 -Table 3
about
here-summarizes the results of the regressions.
The left-hand column shows the regression for the Eurosystem operations.
18As a proxy for the intended volume in the euro area, we use the benchmark allotment
at the announcement date of the tender. Cf. Section 2.
19EONIA = euro overnight index average; LIBOR = London interbank o¤ered rate.
20For the euro area, we use the one-week repo spread, for which the longest time series is
available (settlement not before April 21, 1999). However, the results are almost identical
for the two-week repo.
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Consistent with ndings in prior contributions, arbitrage possibilities had a
strong inuence on bids in the euro area. Indeed, the coe¢ cient of the spread
(   r)t is highly signicant and positive. The time trend is also signicant
and positive.21 The new element here is the regressor for exposure risk. Its
coe¢ cient is highly signicant and negative, as predicted by the theoretical
analysis.
The regression results for the BoE during the pre-crisis period are shown
in the middle column. While the coe¢ cient for arbitrage is positive, it is
not signicant. Moreover, the trend is weakly signicant, but negative. In
sum, this suggests that neither the arbitrage hypothesis nor the rationing
hypothesis had a strong role in the pre-crisis sterling auctions. There is,
however, a signicant and strongly negative e¤ect of exposure risk. In eco-
nomic terms, an increase in (  )t of, say, 5 basis points would lower total
bids by 23.0 percent in the BoE pre-crisis sample, compared with 4.4 percent
in the Eurosystem sample.
Finally, in the right-hand column, the table shows the coe¢ cients for
the BoE during the crisis. The intended volume is signicant, potentially
because bidders became more responsive to information after August 2007.
More importantly for our present analysis, the coe¢ cient for exposure risk
21The usual interpretation of the time trend is that it captures the adaptive response
to rationing, see Nautz and Oechssler (2006).
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is again highly signicant and negative. The somewhat smaller coe¢ cient
for exposure risk, compared with the pre-crisis period, might reect the fact
that the relative scarcity of cash and high-quality collateral became more
balanced during the crisis. That interpretation would also be consistent with
the signicant arbitrage coe¢ cient. In sum, we nd that exposure risk has
been a signicant determinant of bidding behavior in all three samples.
The results of the regressions are consistent with anecdotal evidence on
central bank collateral in euro and sterling markets. In the euro area, el-
igibility criteria for collateral have traditionally been broad. In fact, the
rst mention of a scarcity of collateral came at a time when banks in some
euro area countries felt at a disadvantage during the peak of the overbidding
episode.22 The situation was very di¤erent in sterling markets. Indeed, the
largest fraction of collateral used in sterling operations was gilts (i.e., UK
government bonds), and these were, typically, not owned outright by the
bidders, i.e., by banks and building societies, but were borrowed through
securities lending transactions from the ultimate holders of gilt securities,
namely pension funds and insurance companies. Therefore, when the bid-
to-cover ratio happened to be unexpectedly low, bidders with insu¢ cient
collateral were indeed forced to go in search of more.23
22Cf. Deutsche Bundesbank (2000).
23In fact, there was a squeeze in the gilt market on July 31, 2006. Cf. Bank of England
(2007).
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In the remainder of this section, we discuss informally the performance
of the xed rate tender in the other six cases (cf. Table 1). Consider rst
the three samples in which operations withdrew liquidity from the market,
i.e., the ne-tuning euro operations as well as the liquidity-absorbing weekly
and ne-tuning sterling operations. The exposure risk in these operations
di¤ered from the exposure risk in the liquidity-providing operations discussed
above. If a bidder receives an excessive allotment in a liquidity-absorbing
operation, it has an unexpected outow of liquidity. To compensate, the
bidder must then either borrow in the market or have recourse to the central
banks lending facility.24 Typically, both options will be costly in terms of the
interest rate spread. More critically, credit limits may be exhausted in the
market, and the bidder may also sustain a reputational damage from seeking
additional credit. Finally, it has been suggested that not only in the US but
also in Europe, there may be a stigma attached to the use of the central bank
facility. Therefore, even if protected by anonymity, the bidder might still be
exposed to rumors and insinuations. We conclude that receiving an oversized
allotment in a liquidity-absorbing operation is potentially even more harmful
than receiving an oversized allotment in a liquidity-providing operation. In
particular, this would explain the quite satisfactory performance of the xed
24Further alternatives such as selling assets on short notice are possible, but may not
always be desirable.
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rate tender in these three examples, all of which have very low mean log
bid-to-cover ratios.
Next, we turn to the BoEs liquidity-providing ne-tuning operations.
On the one hand, operations in that sample tend to exhibit a somewhat
higher mean log bid-to-cover ratio than their liquidity-absorbing counter-
parts, which is consistent with the factors discussed above. On the other
hand, their better performance compared with the BoEs weekly liquidity-
providing tenders might be related to the fact that reserve account holders
in the UK had some exibility with regard to the fulllment of their reserve
requirements, which should have lowered demand in the ne-tuning opera-
tions.
Regarding foreign exchange swap operations, Figure 2 shows that in con-
trast to the other examples, the liquidity policy for these operations was
biased towards excess supply, which explains the very low mean log bid-to-
cover ratio of -0.73. During the short period with excess demand, however,
the xed rate tender generated a rather special situation. Specically, if a
bidder received an oversized allotment, it would have a large Swiss franc
liquidity inow as well as a large euro liquidity outow. The exposure risk
associated with the liquidity outow might have contributed to the relatively
swift decline in total bids after the peak of the overbidding period.
Finally, the US dollar tender was similar to an ordinary liquidity-providing
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Eurosystem operation in terms of exposure risk. That is to say, exposure risk
was probably not very pronounced owing to the relatively broad denition
of eligible collateral. This view is consistent with the downward trend in the
allotment quota. Indeed, our results suggest that even lower quotas might
have been possible if these operations had continued in an unchanged market
environment.
9. Related literature
Our main theoretical result is a robust condition for equilibrium existence
when the intended volume of the operation is pre-announced and there are
no costs of bidding. To the best of our knowledge, this result is new in the
literature. Ayuso and Repullo (2003) explain the overbidding observed in
the Eurosystem over the period January 1999 to June 2000 as a consequence
of an asymmetric objective function for the central bank. In contrast to the
present paper, however, Ayuso and Repullo have a cost function that depends
on the size of the bid. Nyborg and Strebulaev (2001) consider equilibria in
xed rate tenders with subsequent short squeezes in liquidity, assuming that
bids are constrained by the amount of collateral held by the bidders. Nautz
and Oechssler (2003) document the overbidding phenomenon. They show
that the rationing game does not allow an equilibrium to exist in a complete-
information setting, and explain the development of aggregate bids during the
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overbidding period as being driven by a myopic best-reply process. Ehrhart
(2001) draws similar conclusions from an experimental study. Bindseil (2005)
provides a survey of the experience of modern central banks with xed rate
tenders, stressing in particular the case of the Eurosystem. He also ana-
lyzes the macro behavior of a banking system facing a cost of bidding that
depends on the aggregate bid.25 Ehrhart (2002) extends the non-existence
result in various ways, allowing in particular for uncertainty about supply
and repeated interaction. Välimäki (2003) assumes a two-part penalty con-
sisting of a punitive interest rate charged on the share of collateral that is not
delivered and a xed ne for non-compliance. He then studies the decision
of an individual bank to bid optimally against a given probability distribu-
tion of aggregate bids submitted by the other banks. Catalão-Lopes (2010)
compares the xed rate tender with the uniform-price tender, stressing the
non-existence result and collateral constraints on bids. Thus, it appears that
the case considered in this paper is not covered by the existing literature.26
10. Conclusion
Central banks are fond of the xed rate tender because it conveys mon-
etary policy signals to the market usually with very little noise. Pro rata
25See also Bindseil (2004).
26This statement includes related work on market disequilibrium (e.g., Bénassy, 1977)
and supply chain management (e.g., Lee et al., 1997).
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allotment is applied in these tenders when the total of bids received exceeds
the total amount that the central bank intends to provide. In the present
paper, we argue that exposure risk is a critical determinant of bidding be-
havior in xed rate tenders. Owing to exposure risk, an equilibrium exists
even when bids are costless and the intended volume of the operation is pre-
announced. In this equilibrium, the extent of overbidding is limited, and
there is a bound below which the allotment quota never falls. We also nd
conditions under which temporarily elevated overbidding factors will, with
adaptive expectations, decline to the levels predicted for the equilibrium. In
particular, this suggests a rationale for the continued use of the xed rate
tender by central banks such as the ECB and the BoE.27
By clarifying the role of exposure risk for bidding behavior in xed rate
tenders, our analysis allows the overbidding phenomenon in the Eurosystem
operations to be put into a somewhat broader context. The comparison
with the sterling market strongly suggests that an absence of exposure risk,
owing to the market-friendly eligibility criteria for central bank collateral,
was a critical factor in the escalation of bids in the euro area. In particular,
our ndings suggest that a potential reintroduction of the xed rate tender
with pro rata allotment in the main renancing operations of the Eurosystem
27Having an equilibrium is also a prerequisite for further theoretical work such as com-
paring the xed rate and variable rate tenders in terms of e¢ ciency. Exploring that issue,
however, would go beyond the scope of the present analysis.
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would presuppose a substantial review of the existing collateral framework.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Recall from the discussion of the optimal bid that
i(0) = 0, and i(i)  i for all i. In particular, we may assume in the
sequel that i > 0 and bi > 0. The rst-order condition associated with a
marginal decrease in bi is
Z 1
0
fvi(bqi(bi; b i); i)  p0g@ bqi
@bi
(bi; b i)dGi(b i)  0, (16)
where
@ bqi
@bi
(bi; b i) =
8<: 1 if bi + b i  1b i
(bi + b i)2
if bi + b i > 1
(17)
denotes the left derivative of the allotment rule (1). Since vi  p0 vanishes at
b i = b0 i, we may safely ignore a potential mass point of Gi(:) at b i = b
0
 i
and rewrite (16) as
Z b0 i
0
fp0   vi(bqi(bi; b i); i)g@ bqi
@bi
(bi; b i)dGi(b i)

Z 1
b0 i
fvi( bi
bi + b i
; i)  p0g b i
(bi + b i)2
dGi(b i). (18)
We claim that under the assumptions of the lemma, for bi > i, the left-
hand side (LHS) of the rst-order condition (18) exceeds the right-hand side
(RHS). But then, lowering bi marginally would raise expected prots. In fact,
31
the continuous function i(:; i) must then be strictly declining for bi > i.
Thus, an optimal bid exists and satises i(i)  i.
RHS. By the denition of S, we have vi(bqi; i)   p0  S(i   bqi) for all
b i  b0 i. Since bqi(bi; :) is convex for b i  b0 i,
i   bqi(bi; b i)  (b i   b0 i) @@b i

b i=b0 i
fi   bqi(bi; b i)g (19)
= (b i   b0 i)
2i
bi
. (20)
Using b i  
P
j 6=ij and bi > i, one nds b i   b0 i  (i +
P
j 6=ij   1).
Moreover, for b i  b0 i,
b i
(bi + b i)2
 1
bi + b i
 1
bi + b0 i
=
i
bi
. (21)
Thus,
RHS  
3
i S
b2i
Z 1
b0 i
(b i   b0 i)dGi(b i) (22)
 
3
i S
b2i
Z
fi +
P
j 6=ij   1g+dFi( i), (23)
where Fi(:) is the conditional distribution of  i = (1; :::; i 1; i+1; :::; n)
given i.
LHS. Using bi > i  i=M , it is straightforward to verify that the
allotment to bidder i exceeds i=M if and only if b i < bM i  bi(M   i)=i.
Note also that bM i > 1 bi. As marginal valuations are declining, and because
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bqi(bi; :) is weakly decreasing, one obtains for b i  bM i that
p0   vi(bqi(bi; b i); i)  p0   vi(bqi(bi; bM i); i) (24)
= vi(i; i)  vi( i
M
; i) (25)
 1 M
M
is. (26)
Moreover, for 1  bi < b i  bM i,
@ bqi
@bi
(bi; b i) =
b i
(bi + b i)2
= (
bi
bi + b i
)2
b i
b2i
 ( i
biM
)2b i. (27)
Also for b i  1  bi,
@ bqi
@bi
(bi; b i) = 1  b i
(M)2
 ( i
biM
)2b i, (28)
because   1=M . Hence,
LHS  (1 M)
3
i s
M3b2i
Z bM i
0
b idGi(b i). (29)
As above, one shows that b i   bM i  (i +
P
j 6=ij  M). Thus, if i +P
j 6=ij M , then b i  bM i. Therefore,
LHS  (1 M)
3
i s
M3b2i
Z
i+
P
j 6=ijM
P
j 6=ijdFi( i) (30)
 (1 M)
3
i s
M3b2i
m  (i; i). (31)
This implies that, indeed, LHS>RHS for all bi > i. 
Proof of Theorem 1. Consider the restricted game in which each bid-
der i = 1; :::; n chooses an overbidding factor i 2 [1;], and bidder is
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payo¤s are given by Ui(1; :::; n; 1; :::; n) = i(ii;
P
j 6=i jj; i). Glicks-
bergs theorem implies existence of an equilibrium in mixed strategies in the
restricted game provided that (R1) payo¤s are equicontinuous, and (R2)
information is absolutely continuous. For details, see Milgrom and We-
ber (1985), and note that our denition of a mixed strategy corresponds
to their notion of a distributional strategy. Condition (R1) holds if the
family of functions fUi(:; 1; :::; n)ji 2 [i; i] for all ig is equicontinuous.
Since payo¤s are continuous in actions, it su¢ ces to show that all functions
k 7! Ui(1; :::; n; 1; :::; n), keeping the other entries xed, are piecewise
di¤erentiable with a uniformly bounded derivative. There are several cases.
Consider rst k 6= i and k > 0. Then @Ui@k = f
@vi
@qi
  p0g @bqi@b i k provided that
k 6= 1k (1  
P
j 6=k jj). It is not hard to check that j @bqi@b i j  1. Moreover,
@vi
@qi
is continuous on the compact set [0; 1] [i; i]. Hence, j @Ui@k j is uniformly
bounded for all k 6= i and k > 0. For k = i and i > 0, the argument
is analogous. Finally, if k = 0, then @Ui@k  0. This proves (R1). Condi-
tion (R2) holds because the joint distribution of types has a density. Thus,
there is an equilibrium (1 ; :::; 

n) in mixed strategies in the restricted game.
Consider now the mapping 'i : [1;]  [i; i] ! R+  [i; i] dened by
'i(i; i) = (ii; i). Given that 'i preserves the type, the pushforward
measure of i with respect to 'i, denoted by 

i = 

i ' 1i , is a mixed strat-
egy in the xed rate tender. Moreover,
R
id(1; :::; n) =
R
Uid(1; :::; n)
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if (1; :::; n) is a prole of mixed strategies in the restricted game, and
(1; :::; n) is the corresponding prole of pushforward strategies. We claim
that (1; :::; 

n) is an equilibrium in the xed rate tender. Let i be an ar-
bitrary deviation by bidder i. Consider the mixed strategy ei = i   1i ,
where
i(bi; i) =
8<:
(i; i) if bi < i
(bi; i) if i  bi  i
(i; i) if bi > i
(32)
maps R+  [i; i] into itself. Intuitively, ei raises all bids bi < i to i, and
lowers all bids bi > i to i. Using Lemma 1, one nds that
Z
id(ei;  i) = Z i(i(bi; i))di(bi; i) (33)

Z
i(bi; i)di(bi; i) =
Z
id(i; 

 i), (34)
where  i = (

1; :::; 

i 1; 

i+1; :::; 

n). Consider, nally, the mapping i :
R+  [i; i]! [1;] [i; i] dened by i(bi; i) = (bi=i; i) if i > 0, and
by i(bi; i) = (1; 0) if i = 0. Note that ei = ei   1i satises
ei  ' 1i = ei   1i  ' 1i = ei  ('i  i) 1 = ei. (35)
Hence, using that (1 ; :::; 

n) is an equilibrium,Z
id(

i ; 

 i) =
R
Uid(

i ; 

 i) 
R
Uid(ei;  i) = Z id(ei;  i), (36)
where  i = (

1 ; :::; 

i 1; 

i+1; :::; 

n). Thus,
R
id(

i ; 

 i) 
R
id(i; 

 i),
and there is indeed no protable deviation. 
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Figure 1: Allotment quotas in ECB fine-tuning operations
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Figure 2: Intended volume and total bids in the weekly
EUR/CHF foreign exchange swap operations
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Figure 3: Marginal valuation function
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Table 1
Recent uses of the fixed rate tender
Mean log
bid-to-cover 
ratio
Period of usage
Notes. The table lists recent uses of the fixed rate tender in the euro area and the UK. Shown are the
period of usage, the mean of the log bid-to-cover ratio, and the number of operations conducted. The
term pre-crisis (crisis) refers to operations with settlement on or before August 2, 2007 (on or after
August 9, 2007). The nine series are listed in order of the mean log bid-to-cover ratio, starting with
the highest value. Note that, owing to the log transform applied to the bid-to-cover ratio, a negative
value of the mean indicates excess supply.
Jan. 99 – June 00
Aug. 07 – Oct. 08
Dec. 07 – Oct. 08
May 06 – Aug. 07
Aug. 06 – Feb. 09
May 03 – Oct. 08
Oct. 08 – Feb. 09
June 06 – Mar. 09
Oct. 08 – Jan. 10
Euro main refinancing operations
Sterling weekly, liquidity-providing operations, crisis
US dollar Term Auction Facility
Sterling weekly, liquidity-providing operations, pre-crisis
Sterling fine-tuning, liquidity-providing operations
Euro fine-tuning operations
Sterling weekly, liquidity-absorbing operations
Sterling fine-tuning, liquidity-absorbing operations
EUR/CHF foreign exchange swap operations
2.92
1.50
1.01
0.94
0.37
-0.03
-0.14
-0.37
-0.73
76
62
21
64
22
32
23
17
70
20 Dec. 2007 28 10 1.0 39 22.080 0.45
27 Dec. 2007 35 10 1.0 27 14.115 0.71
17 Jan. 2008 28 10 1.0 22 14.790 0.68
31 Jan. 2008 28 10 1.0 19 12.400 0.81
27 Mar. 2008 28 15 1.5 34 31.237 0.48
10 Apr. 2008 28 15 1.5 32 30.760 0.49
24 Apr. 2008 28 15 1.5 33 30.128 0.50
8 May 2008 28 25 2.5 31 39.530 0.63
22 May 2008 28 25 2.5 54 58.876 0.42
5 June 2008 28 25 2.5 50 64.855 0.39
19 June 2008 28 25 2.5 56 78.460 0.32
3 July 2008 28 25 2.5 57 84.830 0.29
17 July 2008 28 25 2.5 59 90.075 0.28
31 July 2008 28 25 2.5 63 101.683 0.25
14 Aug. 2008 84 10 1.0 57 38.522 0.26
14 Aug. 2008 28 20 2.0 66 91.100 0.22
28 Aug. 2008 28 20 2.0 69 89.249 0.22
11 Sep. 2008 84 10 1.0 40 31.720 0.32
11 Sep. 2008 28 10 1.0 53 43.340 0.23
25 Sep. 2008 28 25 2.5 71 110.100 0.23
9 Oct. 2008 85 20 2.0 70 88.650 0.23
Table 2
Euro area US dollar operations under the Term Auction Facility conducted as fixed rate tenders
Settlement
date
Duration
(days)
Intended
volume
(€ billions)
Maximum
bid
(€ billions)
Number of 
bidders
Total bids
(€ billions)
Allotment
quota
Notes. The table lists data related to the US dollar operations conducted by the Eurosystem within the framework of
the Term Auction Facility. Shown are the settlement date, the duration, the intended volume, the maximum bid, the
number of bidders, total bids, and the allotment quota.
Table 3
Bid functions for fixed rate tenders
ECB Bank of England
Pre-crisis Crisis
May 2006 – Aug. 2007 Aug. 2007 – Oct. 2008Apr. 1999 – June 2000
at
bt-1
(ρ-r)t
(ρ-σ)t
constant
R-squared
Observations
trend × 102 0.785
(0.306)
0.031
(0.179)
-0.194
(0.187)
0.336
(0.072)
4.024
(0.376)
-0.890
(0.268)
10.30
(3.53)
0.902
61
**
***
***
***
***
-0.407
(0.225)
0.918
(1.346)
0.074
(1.271)
0.575
(0.127)
0.688
(0.811)
-5.317
(1.481)
-6.202
(8.402)
0.692
62
*
***
***
0.096
(0.159)
0.908
(0.071)
-0.216
(0.120)
0.318
(0.111)
2.085
(0.540)
-2.956
(0.515)
1.360
(0.374)
0.954
60
***
***
***
***
***
Notes. The table shows the estimated bid (bt) functions for the fixed rate tenders of the ECB
(left-hand column) and the Bank of England (middle and right-hand columns), compare Eq. (15)
in the text. Confidence levels are *** for p<0.01, ** for p<0.05, and * for p<0.1. Standard errors
are noted in parentheses.
bt-2 0.019(0.069)
0.107
(0.120)
-0.047
(0.064)
*ât-1
